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The safety of motorists, passengers, and pedestrians on roadways 
is a major concern and focus of public policy. In fact, over one million 
fatalities occur every year on roads around the world.1 A leading cause 
of these fatalities in the United States is drivers who speed through red 
lights;2 on average, one thousand people are killed and over one 
hundred and fifty thousand people are injured in crashes that involve 
drivers running red lights each year.3 In an effort to prevent these 
accidents, communities throughout the country have begun to 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., 2006, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. 
1
 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD REPORT ON ROAD TRAFFIC INJURY 
PREVENTION (2004), http://www.who.int/world-health-day/previous/2004/en. 
2 MELISSA SAVAGE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
AUTOMATED TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT (2004), https://ecom.ncsl.org/programs/ 
transportation/0700trnrv.htm 
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implement automated enforcement technology systems, such as red 
light cameras.4  
Currently, lawmakers and private citizens are engaged in a 
nationwide debate over the constitutionality of red light camera 
legislation.5 Proponents believe red light camera laws are not only 
constitutional but are also effective in deterring illegal conduct and 
promoting public safety.6 Legislatures in twenty-three states agree 
with the proponents, already having passed legislation allowing for 
local governments to utilize red light camera systems,7 and 
legislatures in six states are debating action to permit such systems.8
However, opponents of red light cameras argue that these law
constitutional rights because red light camera laws fail to pass the 
rational-basis test required of all legislation.
 
s violate 
                                                
9 In particular, critics 
maintain that there is no legitimate governmental purpose behind red 
light camera laws.10 Rather than promoting public safety, deterring 
illegal conduct or enforcing traffic laws, opponents claim the real 
purpose of red light camera legislation is the generation of revenue for 
local governments.11 
 
4 CAROLINE J. RODIER & SUSAN A. SHAHEEN, AUTOMATED SPEED 
ENFORCEMENT IN THE U.S.: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON BENEFITS AND 
BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION, 3 (CA Transportation Research Board ed.) (2007). 
5 Larry Copeland, Red-Light Cameras Bring Backlash, USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-02-14-redlightside_x.htm. 
6 INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 3. 
7 RODIER & SHAHEEN, supra note 4, at 3. 
8 Connecticut, Hawaii, Mississippi, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Virginia are 
considering red light camera programs. Id. 
9 Copeland, supra note 5. 
10 NATIONAL MOTORISTS ASSOCIATION, REVENUE DRIVERS RED LIGHT 
CAMERAS, NOT SAFETY (2001), 
http://www.motorists.org/pressreleases/home/revenue-drives-red-light-cameras-not-
safety/. The rational-basis test is the least rigorous standard of review applied by 
courts to determine if challenged laws are constitutional. To pass rational-basis 
scrutiny government action must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 773 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lee v. 
City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
11 NATIONAL MOTORISTS ASSOCIATION, supra note 10. 
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Federal courts have been reluctant to address the constitutionality 
of red light camera laws.12 In fact, the Seventh Circuit is the first 
Federal court of appeals to consider whether a red light camera 
ordinance meets the requirements of the rational-basis test under equal 
protection and due process jurisprudence.13 In Idris v. City of Chicago, 
car owners, who were not driving their cars at the time of a violation, 
were fined pursuant to a city ordinance permitting the use of red light 
cameras.14 The car owners brought an action against the City15 
claiming that the ordinance violated the equal protection and due 
process clauses of the United States Constitution.16 In applying the 
rational-basis test, the court held that the ordinance did not violate due 
process and that the ordinance and its classifications were rationally 
related to the City’s goals.17 
This note considers whether the Seventh Circuit’s application of 
the rational-basis test to the Chicago red light camera ordinance was 
appropriately conducted. Part I of this note provides a contextual 
background of red light camera systems and the rational-basis test 
applied to all legislation. Part II analyzes the facts, procedural history 
and holding of the recent Seventh Circuit case, Idris v. City of 
Chicago. Part III argues that although the Seventh Circuit reached the 
correct conclusion, the court did not fully apply the rational-basis test 
to the ordinance. Further, Part III expands upon the Seventh Circuit’s 
reasoning by considering additional arguments raised by red light 
                                                 
12 See Dajani v. Governor and Gen. Assembly of MD, No. Civ.CCB-00-71, 
2001 WL 85181, at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 24, 2001) (dismissing a challenge to red light 
camera law for lack of federal jurisdiction); Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. 
Supp. 2d 702, 725 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (holding that appellant lacked standing to 
challenge red light camera statute). 
13 Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 565 (7th Cir. 2009). 
14 Id. 
15 Car owners also named Chicago Office of Emergency Management and 
Communication, Chicago Department of Revenue, Chicago Department of 
Administrative Hearings, Richard M. Daley, and Redflex Traffic System, Inc. as 
Defendants. Complaint, Idris v. City of Chicago, 2006 WL 4516808 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
16 Idris, 552 F.3d at 565-66. 
17 Id. at 566-67. 
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camera critics and concludes that there is a rational basis to support the 
use of red light camera systems. Finally, this note discusses the 
implications of the Seventh Circuit’s decision to more generalized 
automated enforcement technology systems. 
 
I: GENERAL CONTEXT: RED LIGHT CAMERA SYSTEMS AND THE 
RATIONAL-BASIS DOCTRINE 
 
A. Red Light Camera Systems 
 
Red light camera systems are a type of automated enforcement 
technology18 that take still and/or video photographs of vehicles and 
drivers running red lights.19 Although red light cameras did not appear 
in the United States until the 1990’s,20 as of May 2007, twenty-three 
states and the District of Columbia have laws allowing for red light 
camera systems.21 Within those states, more than three hundred 
communities have implemented such legislation.22  
Due to the advanced technology and high cost of red light 
cameras, local governments contract with private vendors for the 
assembly, installation, and maintenance of the camera systems.23 Each 
                                                 
18 Automated enforcement technology is the use of “image capture 
technologies” to monitor and enforce traffic laws. SHAWN TURNER & AMY POLK, 
OVERVIEW OF AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT IN TRANSPORTATION (1998), 
http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersections/docs/turner.pdf. 
19 U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY 
ADMINISTRATION, RED LIGHT CAMERA SYSTEMS, OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, 
(2005), http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersections/rlc_guide/rlcguide05jan.pdf. 
20 RODIER & SHAHEEN, supra note 4, at 3. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. Local governments in Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, 
Illinois, Maryland, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, Washington, and the District of Columbia use red light cameras. New 
Jersey and Wisconsin prohibit the use of automated enforcement in any situation. Id. 
23 CALIFORNIA STATE AUDITOR, BUREAU OF STATE AUDITS, RED LIGHT 
CAMERA PROGRAMS: ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A REDUCTION IN 
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system consists of three separate mechanisms: a camera, triggers, and 
a computer.24 At a typical red light camera intersection, cameras are 
positioned on poles a few yards above the ground at each corner of the 
intersection.25 The triggers are placed below the asphalt at the stop 
line and in the middle of the intersection.26 Induction loop technology
in the triggers creates a magnetic field that indicates when the vehicle 
has entered the intersection and passed a certain point in the road.
 
 A 
                                                
27
computer—wired to the triggers and the cameras—monitors the traffic 
signal.28 When the traffic signal is green or yellow, the computer 
ignores the vehicles passing over the triggers. Once the light turns red, 
however, photographs are taken of vehicles passing over the triggers.29 
Depending on the particular ordinance, multiple still and/or video 
photographs are taken.30 Usually, the first photo is taken to show the 
vehicle immediately before it enters the intersection against a red light, 
and a second photo is taken just after the vehicle enters the intersection 
while the light is red. 31 Additionally, most jurisdictions require a 
photograph of the rear of the vehicle that includes the license plate 
number.32 The vendor typically receives and initially reviews the 
photographs, and if a violation is suspected, the vendor sends the 
photographs to the designated local government agency. The 
government agency then determines whether a traffic violation has 
 
24 Kevin P. Shannon, Comment, Speeding Towards Disaster: How Cleveland’s 
Traffic Cameras Violate the Ohio Constitution, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 607, 611 







30 SAVAGE, supra note 2. 
31 RED LIGHT CAMERA SYSTEMS, OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at 
24. 
32 THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO STOP RED LIGHT RUNNING, A GUIDE TO RED 
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occurred.33 If a violation has occurred, the photographs are prima 
facie evidence34 of a traffic violation and the vehicle owner or dr
depending on the ordinance, is fined for running a red light.
iver, 
                                                
35 
 
B. Rational-Basis Doctrine 
 
The United States Constitution establishes the fundamental laws 
of our nation and defines the rights and liberties of the American 
people. While federal, state and local governments have the power to 
pass legislation and regulate behavior, the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property without due process of the law, or be denied equal 
protection of the law.36 To determine whether a legislative act violates 
a constitutionally protected right, courts apply one of three standards 
of review: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational-basis.37 
Strict scrutiny is the most stringent of the tests and is applied in 
two general contexts: (1) when governmental action burdens a 
fundamental constitutional right;38 or (2) when governmental action 
involves the use of a suspect classification.39 To pass strict scrutiny 
review, the law must be justified by a compelling governmental 
 
33 Kathryn Grondin, Red-Light Cameras: Safety Tool or Moneymaker?, DAILY 
HERALD, March 2, 2008, available at http://www.dailyherald.com/story/?id=145555. 
34 CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE §9-102-020(a) (2003). 
35 Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06-C-6085, 2008 WL 182248, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 16, 2008). 
36 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
37 U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
38 Fundamental rights are only those rights which are “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 701, 721 
(1997). For examples of fundamental rights see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967) (right to marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942) (right to have children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to 
direct the education and upbringing of one’s children); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy). 
39 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (holding 




Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 4, Issue 2                         Spring 2009 
interest, it must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, and it 
must be the least restrictive means for achieving that interest.40  
Occasionally, the court recognizes that even though a 
classification does not warrant strict scrutiny because the classification 
is not considered suspect—such as gender-based classifications—it 
still deserves heightened review.41 In this instance, the court applies 
the intermediate scrutiny test.42 Under this test, the government must 
show that the challenged law involves an important government 
interest and the classification is substantially related to serving that 
interest.43  
Finally, rational-basis review is the least rigorous test applied by 
courts when determining whether a government has impermissibly 
infringed upon the rights and liberties of a litigant.44 The rational-basis 
test only requires that governmental action be “rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.”45 
All legislation must, at the very least, pass the rational-basis 
test,46 which was first articulated by the Supreme Court in 1897.47 In
Gulf, the Court stated that the Constitution does not “withhold from 
states the power of classification,” but it must appear that the 
classification is “based upon some reasonable ground. . .which bears a 




                                                
48 Thus, when litigants allege that a law 
violates equal protection or due process, but the law neither implicates
 
40 Id. 
41 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Edu., 476 U.S. 267, 301 (1968) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
45 Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 773 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lee v. 
City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
46 Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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The due process clause guarantees that no person shall be denied 
life, liberty, or property without fair process and procedure.50 Within 
the due process clause, courts have recognized two distinct 
components: procedural due process and substantive due process. The 
right to procedural due process requires that a government entity 
“provide a citizen adequate notice. . .as well as ample opportunity to 
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner appropriate 
to the nature of the case.”51 When analyzing procedural due process 
claims, courts apply a cost-benefit analysis to determine what process 
and procedures are due.52 
Substantive due process, on the other hand, prohibits laws that 
unreasonably interfere with protected life, liberty, and property 
rights.53 This doctrine is a safeguard that ensures that government 
action does not impermissibly burden the exercise of these rights.54 As 
such, substantive due process protects against “certain government 
actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement 
them.”55 Under substantive due process review, courts apply the strict 
 
49 F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-314 (1993). 
50 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
51 Chicago Cable Commc’ns v. Chicago Cable Comm’n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1545 
(7th Cir. 1989). 
52 Stating a claim under procedural due process generally involves the 
consideration of three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest, including the function involved and 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirements would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
53 Lisa S. Morris, Photo Radar: Friend or Foe?, 61 UMKC L. REV. 805, 813 
(1993). 
54 Id. 
55 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). 
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scrutiny test when a fundamental right is at stake56 and the rational-
basis test when fundamental rights are not at issue.57 
Rational-basis review is also a key component to analysis under 
the equal protection clause. Under this clause, no citizen shall be 
deprived of equal protection of the law.58 Courts interpret equal 
protection to mean that all persons similarly situated should be treated 
alike.59 Traditionally, analysis under the equal protection clause is 
triggered when a law is based solely on a specific classification, such 
as race or religion, or when a law grants a particular class of citizens 
the right to engage in an activity but denies other citizens that same 
right.60 However, laws that do not implicate a fundamental right or 
suspect classification do not violate the equal protection clause if there 
is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and the 
governmental purpose served.61 Hence, the rational-basis doctrine 
only requires that a classification be rationally related to a legitim
governmental purpose.
ate 
                                                
62 Thus, a classification scheme may be 
invalidated if it is arbitrary or bears no rational relationship to a 
legitimate governmental purpose.63 
 
56 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721 (1997). 
57 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003). 
58 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
59 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting City of 
Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). 
60 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-441. 
61 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 
U.S. 1, 15-17 (1976) (per curium)). 
62 Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963-65 (1982). Only when fundamental 
rights are infringed upon, must legislative actions or classifications be narrowly 
tailored to a compelling governmental interest. The Supreme Court has determined 
that fundamental rights are only those which are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 701, 721 (1997). If other 
less important rights, rights which are not deeply rooted in our nation’s history and 
tradition, are infringed upon, rational-basis review is sufficient. When governmental 
action or legislative classifications infringe on these less important or non-
fundamental rights, such action or classification only needs to be rationally related to 
a legitimate governmental purpose. Id. 
63 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973). 
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Under both substantive due process and equal protection, the 
court makes a factual determination on a case-by-case basis to 
determine whether governmental action or a classification is rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental interest. When applying the 
rational-basis test, courts cannot interfere too much with, or second-
guess, the work of the legislature.64 As such, the court “may not sit as 
a superlegislature” to determine the “wisdom or desirability” of 
legislative policy decisions.65 A method is not deemed 
unconstitutional simply because there are other means to accomplish




 which the 
                                                
66 Further, courts assume that
the objectives articulated by the legislature are the actual purposes o
the statute, unless a litigant proves otherwise.67 To prove otherwise, a 
challenging litigant must convince the court that the facts on
classification or action was based could not reasonably be conceived 
as true68 and must negate “every conceivable basis which might 
support it.”69 Noting this uphill battle, the Supreme Court reminds 
litigants that “for protection against abuses by legislatures the people 
must resort to the polls, not to the courts.”70 Thus, under rational-basis 
review, courts are traditionally very reluctant to overturn government 
action.71 
When litigants bring claims under equal protection or substantive 
due process with regard to automated enforcement technology 
legislation, the court must determine which standard of review to 
apply. With regard to red light camera laws, such laws do not classify 
based on race, national origin, religion, or alienage. Further, 
 
64 Heller, 509 U.S. at 319-20. 
65 City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). 
66 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 813 (1976). 
67 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 (1981) (quoting 
Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n. 16 (1975)). 
68 Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 113 (1979). 
69 Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973). 
70 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (citing 
Munn v. State of Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)). 
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fundamental rights are not infringed upon because, as the Seventh 
Circuit noted, no one has a fundamental right to run a red light or to 
avoid being seen by a camera on a public street.72 Therefore, the 
rational-basis test is applied by courts when considering the 
constitutionality of red light camera legislation. 
 
II: IDRIS V. CITY OF CHICAGO  
 
A. Factual Background 
 
In July of 2003, the City of Chicago enacted Chapter 9-102-020 
of the Chicago Traffic Code (“Chapter 9-102”), establishing a red light 
camera ordinance providing that: 
(a) The registered owner of record of a vehicle is liable for a 
violation of this section and the fine set forth in Section 9-
100-020 when the vehicle is used in violation of Section 9-8-
020(c) or Section 9-16-030(c) and that violation is recorded 
by a traffic control signal monitoring device as determined by 
a technician who inspects the recorded image created by the 
device. A photographic recording of a violation obtained by a 
traffic control signal monitoring device and that has been 
inspected by a technician shall be prima facie evidence of a 
violation of this chapter.73  
Chapter 9-102 allows the City to install cameras at traffic 
intersections throughout Chicago.74 These cameras are programmed to 
automatically take still and video photographs of cars that enter 
intersections during red lights or make illegal turns against red 
lights.75 The photographs obtained are inspected by a technician and 
are prima facie evidence of a violation.76 Generally, the registered car 
                                                 
72 Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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owner is then liable for a ninety dollar fine.77 These owners may 
challenge the fine by mail or through an administrative hearing, but 
may only raise a limited number of defenses.78 The enumerated 
defenses do not allow an owner to deny liability by claiming that she 
was not driving the car at the time the violation occurred.79 In fact, the 
ordinance provides that the owner of the vehicle is liable for the fine







                                                
80 Therefore, “if a car owner 
lends her car to a friend, the friend runs a red light, and the incident i
caught on camera, the owner rather than the friend will be liable for 
the ninety dollar fine.”81 Chapter 9-102 does provide a defense if 
car owner is a motor vehicle dealership or a manufacturer and ha
leased the vehicle pursuant to a formal, written lease agreem
Under that circumstance, the lessee is responsible for 
In October of 2003, the City contracted with Redflex for the 
purchase, installation, monitoring, and maintenance of the City’s red 
light camera system.84 Under the contract, Redflex is responsible for 
 
77 Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06-C-6085, 2008 WL 182248, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 16, 2008). 
78 CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE §9-102-040 (2003). Owners of vehicle are not 
liable for red light violation fines if (1) the operator of the vehicle was issued a 
uniform traffic citation for running the red light or making an illegal turn on red; (2) 
the vehicle or its state registration plates were reported as being stolen and were not 
recovered by the owner at the time of the alleged violation; (3) the vehicle was 
leased to another person and within 60 days of notice, the owner informed the city of 
the lessee’s name and address and provided the city with a copy of the lease 
agreement; (4) the vehicle was an authorized emergency vehicle, the vehicle entered 
into the intersection in order to yield the right-of-way to an emergency vehicle, or 
the vehicle was lawfully participating in a funeral procession; (5) the facts alleged in 
the violation notice are inconsistent to or do not support a finding that a red light 
violation occurred; or (6) that the respondent was not the registered owner or lessee 
of the cited vehicle at the time of the violation. Id. 
79 CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-102-020 (2003). 




84 Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, 2007 WL 1348773, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
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reviewing the photographs, making an initial determination of whether 
a violation occurred, and transmitting the information to the City for 
further review.85 The City’s Department of Revenue is responsible for 
making the final determination for the purpose of issuing a notice of 
violation.86 
In 2006, Plaintiffs were issued fines under Chapter 9-102, but 
complained that they were not driving the vehicle at the time of the 
alleged violation.87 Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit in the Northern 
District Court of Illinois against the City88 claiming that the red light 
camera ordinance violates both the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the United States Constitution.89  
 
B. Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims 
 
 In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that the 
ordinance violates their equal protection rights by treating registered 
owners of non-leased vehicles differently than registered owners of 
leased vehicles with a formal, written lease agreement.90 Further, 
Plaintiffs claimed that the ordinance violates their equal protection 
rights by treating persons charged with violating the City ordinance 
                                                 
85 Id. 
86Id. 
87 Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06-C-6085, 2008 WL 182248, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 16, 2008). 
88 Plaintiffs also named the Chicago Office of Emergency Management and 
Communication, Chicago Department of Revenue, Chicago Department of 
Administrative Hearings, Richard M. Daley, and Reflex Traffic System, Inc. as 
Defendants. Complaint, 2006 WL 4516808 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
89 Id. at ¶ 554-55, 2006 WL 4516808 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Plaintiffs also claimed 
that Defendants violated various Chicago ordinances, Illinois statutes, and the 
Illinois Constitution by enacting the ordinance.  In addition, Plaintiffs alleged that 
the ordinance violates their procedural due process rights. However, this note 
focuses on the Seventh Circuit’s application of the rational-basis test to the red light 
camera ordinance; therefore, Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims will only be 
addressed in footnotes.  
90 Id. at ¶ 87. 
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differently than persons charged with violating the Illinois Vehicle 
Code.91 
Plaintiffs also alleged that the ordinance violates their substantive 
due process rights by penalizing the owners of vehicles “without 
regard for whether the registered owners were driving their vehicles at 
the time of the alleged commission of the red light violation.”92 
Plaintiffs argued that the ordinance bears no rational relationship to 
any legitimate government purpose of the City and further alleged that 
the ordinance is “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” because it 
“makes irrelevant whether the penalized party actually violated a red 
traffic signal.”93 Lastly, Plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance violates 
their due process rights by “establishing a conclusive presumption of 
liability” unless they can establish that one of the enumerated defenses 
should apply to their case.94  
The overarching theme throughout Plaintiffs’ arguments was that 
the City’s ordinance furthers no legitimate governmental purpose.95 
Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that the City is using the red light 
ordinance as a “take-no-prisoners revenue producer,” rather than a 
mechanism to deter illegal conduct or regulate vehicles for public 
safety purposes.96 According to Plaintiffs, if the City’s true purpose is 
                                                 
91 Id. at ¶ 98. Under Chapter 9-102, a violation of the red light ordinance is 
considered a quasi-criminal, non-moving offense where the registered owner of a 
vehicle is fined $90 upon each conviction, regardless of how many violations the 
owner has previously committed. For the same conduct, under Illinois law, if a 
police officer cites a driver for a red light moving violation, the driver would be 
guilty of a petty offense (fine only) for the first or second conviction and a Class C 
misdemeanor (fine/points off license/other penalties) for the third and all subsequent 
convictions occurring within one year of the first conviction. Id. at ¶ ¶ 98-101. 
92 Id. at ¶ 77. 
93 Id. at ¶ 79, 2006 WL 4516808 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
94 Id. at ¶ 108. Plaintiffs also alleged that the program violates their procedural 
due process rights because vehicle owners are not afforded meaningful notice or an 
opportunity to be heard as they are prohibited from raising the defense that they were 
not driving the vehicle at the time of the alleged violation. Id. 
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to deter illegal conduct, enforce traffic laws, and promote public 
safety, then the City would implement different mechanisms to 
achieve its goals.97 Therefore, Plaintiffs argued, the ordinance should 
be considered invalid as it does not meet the requirements of the 
rational-basis test. 
 
C. The District Court Opinion 
 
In his opinion for the Northern District of Illinois, Judge 
Gettleman entertained two motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), one filed by the City of Chicago and 
one filed by Redflex.98 Defendants argued that Plaintiffs failed to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted; Judge Gettleman agreed 
and dismissed all federal counts, specifically alleging violations of the 
equal protection and due process clauses.99 
Under his equal protection analysis, Judge Gettleman stated that 
ordinance is subject to rational-basis review because Chapter 9-102 
does not create a suspect classification, such as race, alienage, or 
national origin.100 Applying the rational-basis test, the court first 
considered whether the ordinance has a legitimate governmental 
purpose. As required by the test, Judge Gettleman gave deference to 
the legislature and accepted the City’s stated purpose of the red light 
camera ordinance: public safety, deterrence, and enforcement of traffic 
laws.101  
                                                 
97 Id. Plaintiffs argue that if the City was attempting to deter drivers from 
running red lights, it would “(i) target and prosecute the drivers who committed the 
unlawful conduct; (ii) make its police presence open and obvious at the various 
intersections, such as posting visible signs alerting others to the fact that the 
intersection is monitored by cameras; and/or (iii) alert other drivers at the 
intersection through sounds, lights or other mechanisms to the fact that a driver has 
just been identified as having gone through a red light.” Id. 
98 Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06-C-6085, 2008 WL 182248, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 16, 2008). 
99 Id. 
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Judge Gettleman then considered whether the classification 
treating car owners differently from car dealerships is rationally 
related to the purpose of the ordinance.102 The classification was 
determined to be rationally related to the governmental purpose 
because “‘lessors of cars have, in effect, turned over regular, active 
possession and use, and lack day-to-day control over who drives the 
vehicle,’ whereas a car owner who ‘simply lends his vehicle to another 
individual…retains responsibility for the vehicle.’”103 
Judge Gettleman also considered whether, under equal protection 
jurisprudence, it is unlawful for the City and State to have different 
liability and punishment schemes for the same conduct.104 He noted 
that Plaintiffs do not claim the ordinance itself treats similarly situated 
people differently; rather, Plaintiffs argue that it is unlawful for Illinois 
law and the ordinance to treat the same conduct—running a red 
light—differently.105 However, Plaintiffs’ argument was rejected 
because without challenging a classification made by ordinance itself, 
“such a claim is not cognizable under the equal protection clause.”106 
Finally, the court considered Plaintiffs’ substantive due process 
claims by initially noting that if a fundamental right is not implicated, 
the court must apply the rational-basis test.107 He determined that 
based on precedent, a ninety dollar fine was not sufficient to establish 
a fundamental right, and, thus, rational-basis review was sufficient.108 
After analyzing multiple cases,109 Judge Gettleman held that the 
                                                 
102 Id. 
103 Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06-C-6085, 2008 WL 182248, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 16, 2008) (quoting Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, 2007 WL 1348773, at *7 
(N.D. Ill. 2007)). 
104 Id. at *5. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. (citing Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 773 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
108 Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06-C-6085, 2008 WL 182248, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 16, 2008). 
109 For example, Judge Gettleman considered the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bennis v. Michigan, where the Court rejected a due process challenge to a statute 
that allowed forfeiture of a car used in an illegal manner even when the owner of the 
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ordinance’s imposition of liability on owners, rather than drivers, of 
cars that violated red light signals is rationally related to advancing its 
interest of deterrence, public safety, and enforcement of traffic laws 
because owners have sole authority and responsibility over the use of 
their vehicles.110 
 
D. The Appeal 
 
 Plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit claiming that the district 
court erred in finding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under equal 
protection and due process.111 Plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal were: 
(1) the City’s ordinance violates substantive due process because the 
ordinance is “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable” in that it penalizes 
vehicle owners for alleged moving violations committed not 
necessarily by the vehicle owners but by independent drivers, and the 
ordinance does not promote the safety or general welfare of the public; 
and (2) the City’s ordinance violates equal protection because the 
ordinance lacks a legitimate governmental purpose and its 
classification is not rationally related to any legitimate governmental 
purpose.112 
                                                                                                                   
car was not implicated in the illegal activity. 516 U.S. 442, 446 (1996). The Court 
held that the statute was constitutional in part because “a long and unbroken line of 
cases holds that an owner’s interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use 
to which the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be put 
to such use.” Id. at 446. 
110 Id. Judge Gettleman also dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim that Chapter 9-102 
violates procedural due process. The court cited to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Van Harken v. City of Chicago, where an administrative scheme for adjudicating 
parking violations was upheld under due process because very little was at stake 
(maximum fine of one hundred dollars), and the “benefits of the truncated procedure 
outweighed its costs.” Id. at *8 (citing Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 
1346, 1356 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
111 Plaintiffs claimed that the ordinance also violates procedural due process 
because no procedural safeguards exist and the cost and benefits of the procedural 
safeguards outweigh the liability scheme. Pl.’s App. Brief, 2008 WL 1767206, at *2 
(7th Cir. 2008). 
112Id. at *2 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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E. The Seventh Circuit Opinion 
 
 Chief Judge Easterbrook wrote a concise five-page opinion for the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the district court’s ruling. 
The Seventh Circuit held that the City’s ordinance did not violate due 
process and was rationally related to the City’s goals.113 
The court began by addressing Plaintiffs’ substantive due process 
claim by emphasizing that no one has a fundamental right to run a red 
light or to avoid being seen by a camera on a public street.114 Although 
Plaintiffs’ interest at stake is a ninety dollar traffic violation fine, Judge 
Easterbrook noted that the Supreme Court has never held that a 
property interest “so modest” is a fundamental right.115 
The court explained that in Washington v. Glucksberg, the 
Supreme Court clearly established that only state action that impinges 
on fundamental rights is subject to heightened review under 
substantive due process.116 Finding that no fundamental right was at 
stake, Judge Easterbrook applied the rational-basis test by asking, “is it 
rational to fine the owner rather than the driver?”117 He succinctly 
answered his question: “[c]ertainly so.”118 
According to the court, the benefits of the ordinance can be 
achieved “only if the owner is held responsible” because photographs 
can reliably confirm which cars go through red lights, but not 
necessarily who was driving.119 The court also noted that it is rational 
to fine the owner because photographic enforcement reduces the cost 
of law enforcement and if the ordinance requires drivers to be fined, 
enforcement would be very difficult because drivers could blame 
                                                 
113 Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 566-68 (7th Cir. 2009). 
114 Id. at 566. 
115 Id. 
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others.120 Judge Easterbrook offered practical advice to car owners not 
driving at the time of the alleged violation: insist that the driver 
reimburse you for the ninety-dollar fine.121 
The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that Chapter 9-102 violates 
substantive due process because the ordinance penalizes innocent 
owners without regard to fault.122 The court stated that “legal systems 
often achieve deterrence by imposing fines or penalties without 
fault.”123 For example, the Supreme Court has held that a system 
subjecting any car used in a crime to forfeiture, even though the owner 
may not have had anything to do with the offense, is constitutional 
because the system increases owners’ vigilance.124 Also, a system that 
allows for eviction of tenants from public housing because of a guest’s 
misbehavior was found to be constitutional by the Supreme Court 
because the threat of eviction induces owners to exercise control over 
their guests.125 In another example, the Supreme Court held that it was 
proper to impose penalties on a taxpayer whose income tax return is 
false, even if the taxpayer’s accountant or attorney is responsible for 
the error, because the threat of penalty will cause the taxpayer to 
choose her adviser more carefully.126 The court stated that fining a 
car’s owner is rational for the same reasons: “owners will take more 
care when lending their cars, and often they can pass the expense on to 
the real wrongdoer.”127 
Plaintiffs insisted that the presumption of liability on the owner 
under the City’s ordinance is irrational because Illinois law fines 
drivers, not owners, for moving violations.128 However, Judge 
                                                 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Pl.’s App. Brief, 2008 WL 1767206, at *7 (7th Cir. 2008). 
123 Idris, 552 F.3d at 566.  
124 Id. (citing Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996)). 
125 Id. (citing Department of Housing & Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 
U.S. 125 (2002)). 
126 Id. (citing United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985)). 
127 Id. at 567 (7th Cir. 2009). 
128 Pl.’s App. Brief, 2008 WL 1767206, at *7 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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Easterbrook pointed out that just because a state does things one way 
does not mean that it is irrational for a city to do things another way.129 
Both systems can be rational.130 The court reminded Plaintiffs that a 
federal court “assumes that the action is authorized as a matter of local 
law and asks only whether federal law forbids what the city or state 
has done.”131 Judge Easterbrook suggested that a challenge to 
procedures used in the City’s ordinance would be better heard in state 
court.132 
The court briefly addressed Plaintiffs’ assertion that the ordinance 
is purely a ploy to generate revenue by stating, “[t]hat the City’s 
system raises revenue does not condemn it.”133 According to the court, 
a system that raises money while improving compliance with traffic 
laws cannot be called “unconstitutionally whimsical.”134 Further, the 
court stated that taxes, “whether on liquor or running red lights,” are 
valid municipal endeavors and a fine not only raises revenue, but also 
discourages the taxed activity.135 
Plaintiffs also alleged that the district court erred when it found 
that the City’s red light camera ordinance did not violate the equal 
protection clause.136 Plaintiffs claimed that the district court failed to 
consider whether the red light ordinance has a legitimate governmental 
purpose.137 According to Plaintiffs, the ordinance is invalid because no 
                                                 
129 Idris, 552 F.3d at 567. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 556. (discussing Minnesota v. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d 577 (2007) 
(holding a Minneapolis ordinance similar to Chicago’s invalid due to preemption 
because the state law and city ordinance differ in their approaches to enforcement). 
The Seventh Circuit declined to address whether Illinois law preempts the city 
ordinance because, “[w]hether a state law permits the action in the first place is a 
question for state courts.” Id. 
133 Idris, 552 F.3d at 566. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
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legitimate purpose exists.138 The Seventh Circuit chose not to address 
Plaintiffs’ argument, and instead found the distinction between lessors 
and other owners to be reasonable because the lessee is treated in most 
ways as the car owner.139 Judge Easterbrook acknowledged 
circumstances in which an owner of a car will not always have control 
over the car and driver, such as parent living in California lending a 
car to a child who lives in Chicago.140 However, the court concluded 
that “review under the rational-basis doctrine tolerates an imprecise 
match of statutory goals and means.”141 For the foregoing reasons, the 





A. The Seventh Circuit Failed to Sufficiently Apply the Rational-
Basis Test to the Red Light Camera Ordinance 
 
 In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit correctly held that the red light 
camera ordinance passes the rational-basis test; however, its 
application of the test was insufficient. As previously discussed, under 
the ordinance, vehicle owners are liable for running red lights 
regardless of who was actually driving.143 According to Plaintiffs, this 
provision violates substantive due process because it is not rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.144  
                                                 
138 Id. 
139 Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 567 (7th Cir. 2009). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Judge Easterbrook also dismissed Plaintiffs’ argument that Chapter 9-102 
violated procedural due process by stating (1) all the defenses available under state 
law for running a red light are available at a hearing, (2) photographs are at least as 
reliable as live testimony, and (3) due process allows administrative decisions to be 
made on photographic records without regard to the hearsay rule. Id. at 568. 
143 CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE §9-102-030 (2003). 
144 Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 77-78, 2006 WL 4516808 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
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In its application of the rational-basis test, the court first failed to 
clearly state whether the ordinance was enacted in furtherance of a 
governmental interest. The court could have easily cited the City’s 
stated purpose for enacting the red light camera ordinance: enforcing 
traffic laws.145 Also, the court should have quoted the preamble of the 
ordinance which identifies another legitimate governmental interest: 
“preservation of public safety by reducing the number of accidents 
resulting from vehicles running red lights.”146 By failing to do so, the 
court missed an opportunity to set clear precedent and inform future 
litigants that challenging the red light camera ordinance, and other 
similar laws, on the basis that no legitimate governmental interest 
exists, will fail. 
Second, the court failed to sufficiently explain why fining vehicle 
owners is rationally related to the purposes of the ordinance. 
According to Judge Easterbrook, it is rational to fine owners, because 
a camera can reliably show which cars go through red lights, 
enforcement would be too difficult if drivers had to be fined, and 
cameras reduce the cost of law enforcement.147 While these points are 
valid, the court did not explain how or why they are rationally related 
to the governmental interests of public safety, deterrence or 
enforcement of traffic laws. 
To address these concerns, the court should have explained that 
under rational-basis review, choices made by the City are given a 
strong presumption of validity, rebuttable only when there is no 
conceivable set of facts to support a rational relationship between the 
challenged provision and the City’s legitimate goals.148 Further, it is 
for the legislature, not the court, to balance the advantages and 
disadvantages of a certain provision.149 
Here, fining the driver would be rationally related to the purposes 
of the ordinance. The driver is the person who ran the red light, and, 
                                                 
145 Def.’s App., 2008 WL 2740753, at *22 (7th Cir. 2008). 
146 Id. (citing Council Journal, Jul. 9, 2003). 
147 Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 567 (7th Cir. 2009). 
148 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993). 
149 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). 
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therefore, the person who broke the law and endangered the public. 
Under the same reasoning, if the registered owner was driving the car 
at the time of violation, fining the owner is rationally related to the 
purposes of the ordinance. Therefore, the only issue arises when car 
owners are fined even though they were not driving at the time of 
violation. However, the ordinance will not fail under rational-basis 
review because of this inequality. 
To start, it is rational for the City to assume that registered owners 
commonly drive their own cars. 150 Following that premise, it is also 
rational for the City to assume that when vehicles are cited for running 
red lights, vehicle owners are commonly in the driver’s seat. 
Therefore, fining vehicle owners is rationally related to the purposes 
of the ordinance because, more likely than not, the vehicle owner is 
the person who actually ran the red light and endangered the public. 
Moreover, the City’s chosen method for addressing the problems 
it faces need not be made with “mathematical nicety.”151 As such, the 
City ordinance will not be invalidated solely because “in practice it 
results in some inequality.”152 Red light camera systems arguably 
increase the number of traffic offenses detected which in turn 
promotes public safety by deterring dangerous driving.153 In order to 
achieve these results, it is a necessary evil to fine owners rather than 
drivers because drivers cannot be reliably identified by the cameras.154 
The court should have made clear that while this provision may result 
in some inequality, the City determined that in order to accomplish the 
purposes of the ordinance, fining owners is a necessary evil which is 
allowable under rational-basis review.155 
                                                 
150 State v. Dahl, 87 P.3d 650, 655 (Or. 2004). 
151 F.C.C. v. Breach Commc’ns., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 316 no.7 (1993) (quoting 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)). 
152 Id. 
153 SAVAGE, supra note 2. 
154 Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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The court also addressed Plaintiffs’ argument that the ordinance 
violates equal protection because it treats lessors and other vehicle 
owners differently.156 Judge Easterbrook correctly chose to apply the 
rational-basis test but again failed to sufficiently apply the test. By not 
addressing Plaintiffs’ argument that no legitimate government purpose 
exists, the court left the door open for future litigants to bring such 
claims. Instead, the court should have clearly stated that public safety, 
deterrence, and enforcement of traffic laws are the purposes of this 
ordinance, which generally have been long-accepted as legitimate 
governmental interests.157 
According to the court, the classification between lessors and 
other owners is rational because a lessee is treated for many purposes 
as the car’s owner.158 Judge Easterbrook notes that owners will not 
always have control over their vehicle, but rational-basis review 
permits an imprecise match of statutory goals and means.159 To bolster 
its opinion, the court should have found that lessors and owners who 
lend their vehicles are not similarly situated. Owners claiming to have 
informal lease agreements are actually lending their vehicles to family, 
friends or other drivers, not leasing them. Whereas, car dealerships 
enter into contractual, formal lease agreements which grant individuals 
“exclusive possession, use, control, and responsibility” over vehicles. 
160 For all intents and purposes relating to traffic laws, the lessee is 
treated as the car’s owner. Thus, drawing a distinction between owners 
and lessors does not deny any equal protection right because the two 
groups are not similarly situated. In fact, it is far more rational to treat 
owners and lessees in the same way because both groups have 
                                                 
156 Idris, 552 F.3d at 567. 
157 Protecting the safety of citizens, deterring illegal conduct, and reducing 
traffic violations are legitimate government interests. See Walter v. City of Chicago, 
1992 WL 88457, at *3 (N.D. Ill. April 27, 1992); National Paint & Coatings v. 
Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1995); Grant v. City of Chicago, 594 F. Supp. 
1441, 1447 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 87 (2003). 
158 Idris, 552 F.3d at 567. 
159 Id. 
160 625 ILCS 5/1-137. 
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possession, use, control, and responsibility for their vehicles, while 
lessors do not. 
 
B. Under an Expanded Analytical Framework, Red Light Camera 
Laws Still Pass the Rational-Basis Test 
 
In a very brief analysis, the Seventh Circuit determined that the 
City’s red light camera ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental purpose. The court was not required to consider other 
evidence presented by red light camera critics regarding the purpose of 
these laws because “legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-
finding” under rational-basis review.161 However, even when 
considering evidence that attempts to negate a legitimate governmental 
purpose, red light camera laws still pass the rational-basis test. 
 
1. Critics Argue Red Light Camera Laws are Revenue Generating 
Machines 
 
Red light camera opponents argue that such programs lack a 
legitimate purpose and, instead, are simply revenue generating 
mechanisms.162 Lon Anderson, spokesperson for AAA Mid-Atlantic, 
said that the motor club believes red light camera programs are 
targeted at generating revenue, rather than reducing crashes.163 To 
                                                 
161 F.C.C. v. Breach Commc’ns., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 307 (1993). 
162 Aaron Chambers, Lawmakers Stop Red-Light Camera Bill Passage, 
ROCKFORD REGISTER STAR, May 27, 2008, 
http://www.rrstar.com/archive/x1353501007/Lawmakes-stop-red-light-camera-bill-
passage. 
163 Del Quentin Wilber and Derek Willis, D.C. Red-Light Cameras Fail to 
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support this theory, Anderson drew attention to the amount of money 
cities have netted from these programs.164  
For example, the District of Columbia collected more than fifty-
two million dollars in revenue since enacting a red light camera 
program in 1999.165 In Charlotte, North Carolina, the city collected 
over two million dollars from August of 1999 through July of 2000 in 
red light camera fines.166 In just three months, cameras at one 
intersection in suburban Schaumburg, Illinois raked in one million 
dollars in fines; but the cameras have since been deactivated amidst a 
flurry of complaints.167 The existing one hundred thirty-six cameras in 
Chicago have generated one hundred million dollars.168 Recently, 
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley made clear that the red light camera 
ordinance is designed to increase the number of citations issued and 
close the gap in the 2009 budget.169 With millions of dollars at stake, 
critics of the red light cameras claim that this evidence clearly 
demonstrates that the main purpose of red light camera laws is to raise 
                                                 
164 Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Critics Say Red Light Photo Enforcement a 
Shakedown, FOX NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,97286,00.html. 
165 Id. 
166 Andrew W.J. Tarr, Picture It: Red Light Cameras Abide by the Law of the 
Land, 80 N.C. L Rev. 1879, 1887 (2002). 
167 Carolyn Starks, Schaumburg Turns off Red-Light Camera near Woodfield, 
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-red-lights-
26-feb26,0,4193191.story. After collecting one million dollars in fines, the village of 
Schaumburg deactivated the red light camera near Woodfield Mall amidst a “flurry 
of complaints –some from scofflaws threatening never to shop again at the mall….” 
Id. Village officials reported that the camera “wasn’t improving safety that much 
anyway.” Id. 
168 Federal Court Upholds Use of Red Light Cameras for Profit, THE 
NEWSPAPER, Jan. 6, 2009, http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/26/2648.asp. 
169 Id. Also, in 2007 when reporters asked Chicago’s Council Finance 
Committee Chairman Ed Burke whether revenue was the reason for cameras, he 
responded, “[o]f course it is. It’s budgeted in our annual appropriation 
ordinance. . .the reality is people blow through these intersections and they’re going 
to be caught and they’re going to be fined. . .it has become a big revenue source, 
absolutely.” Chicago Alderman Admits Cameras are for Revenue, THE NEWSPAPER, 
June 22, 2007, http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/18/1820.asp. 
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revenue, not promote safety, deter illegal conduct, or enforce traffic 
laws. 
  However, Plaintiffs and critics nationwide fail to cite any case law 
or authority holding that raising revenue is not a legitimate 
governmental purpose; to the contrary, one of the main purposes of 
government is to raise revenue and levy taxes.170 Further, fines are 
very common punishment for municipal violations and are often used 
as a method of deterrence.171 However, in the case at bar, the City does 
not argue that raising revenue was its legitimate governmental interest 
when enacting the red light camera ordinance. Rather, the preamble 
states that the purposes of the ordinance are enforcement of traffic 
laws and promotion of public safety by deterring dangerous driving.172 
As the Seventh Circuit explained, just because an ordinance may 
generate revenue does not negate other legitimate government 
purposes the ordinance may have.173 If this were the case, any 
municipal endeavor that fines citizens for violations could be called 
into question for lacking a legitimate governmental purpose. Under 
rational-basis review, courts assume that the purposes articulated by 
the legislature are the actual purposes of legislation, unless a litigant 
proves otherwise.174 Merely citing the amount of revenue collected, 
albeit an astonishing account, does not prove otherwise or negate that 
fact that these programs have legitimate governmental purposes. In 
fact, the amount of money generated by these cameras from red light 
violations proves the magnitude of the problem facing city officials. 
 
                                                 
170 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 75-76 (1824). 
171 Towers v. City of Chicago, 173 F.3d 619, 624 (7th Cir. 1999). 
172 Def.’s App., 2008 WL 2740753, at *22 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Council 
Journal, Jul. 9, 2003). 
173 Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2009). 
174 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 (1981) (quoting 
Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n. 16 (1975)). 
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2. Critics Argue Red Light Camera Laws are Causing, Not 
Preventing, Accidents 
 
According to critics of red light cameras, not only are cities 
making profits from the cameras, but, perhaps more importantly, the 
cameras are not promoting public safety. For example, in Chicago, 
pedestrian deaths are on the rise despite the use of red light 
cameras.175 Also, an analysis of crash statistics reported by the 
Washington Post indicates that the number of accidents has actu








cameras argue that proponents cannot honestly claim that the purpose 
                                                
176 Traffic consultant and former senior researcher at 
Northwestern University’s Center for Public Safety, Dick Raub, said 
red light cameras “are not performing any better than intersecti
out cameras.”177  
Further, researchers at the University of South Florida College o
Public Health concluded that rather than improving motorist safety
red light cameras significantly increase accidents.178 Lead author 
Barbara Langland-Orban reported that “the rigorous studies clearly 
show red-light cameras don’t work.”179 According to that report, the 
cameras cause crashes and injuries when drivers attempt to abruptly
stop upon approaching a camera intersection.180 Critics of red light 
 
175 Tracy Swartz, Pedestrian Deaths in Chicago are up Despite Safety 
Measures, CHI. TRIB., Feb 17, 2009, www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-
pedestrian-safety-17-feb17,0,5315575.story. Specifically, fifty-six pedestrians were 
killed in 2008, which is up from forty-nine deaths in 2007 and forty-eight deaths in 
2006. Id. 
176 Wilber & Willis, supra note 163. Three outside traffic specialists 
independently reviewed data and were surprised to discover that cameras do not 
appear to be making any difference in preventing injuries or collisions. Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Barbara Langland-Orban, Red-Light Running Cameras: Would Crashes, 
Injuries and Automobile Insurance Rates Increase if they are Used in Florida?, FLA. 
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of these programs is to promote public safety when studies 
demonstrate that red light cameras actually cause accidents. 
However, even if the abovementioned studies are correct, the 
rational-basis test does not require that the governmental purpose of 
legislation be fully effectuated.181 As the Supreme Court made clear, 
the judiciary’s role is not to judge the wisdom of the legislature’s 
policy determinations or consider if the policies chosen are 
effective.182 Further, even if the rational-basis test mandated that 
legislation be successful in accomplishing the governmental purpose, 
there is evidence that suggests that red light camera systems are 
reducing traffic accidents. For example, the Insurance Institute for 
Highway Safety reported that the introduction of cameras at 
intersections in Virginia lowered red light violations by forty-four 
percent.183 Also, in New York City, one year after implementing 
cameras, accidents due to red light running had decreased by seventy 
percent.184 Similarly, in Howard County, Maryland, red light crashes at 
one particular intersection were reduced by almost fifty percent in one 
year,185 and in Oxnard, California, red light violations declined by 
forty-two percent after the installation of cameras.186 Likewise, 
Chicago officials report that since cameras were installed in 2003, red 
light running has been reduced by fifty-nine percent.187 
Considering all of the available evidence, the true effect of red 
light cameras on public safety remains unclear; however, courts only 
need to determine whether a legitimate governmental purpose could 
conceivability exist and whether the legislation or classification is 
                                                 
181 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1993). 
182 Id. 
183 James M. Rose, Red Light Violations in New York City—Use of Cameras, 
NYVEH §26:12 (2008). 
184 SAVAGE, supra note 2. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Fran Spielman, Red-Light Cam Firm Gets $32M Payday, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
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rationally related to that purpose.188 Therefore, the success rate of red 
light camera systems need not be considered under rational-basis 
review. 
 
3. Critics Argue Alternatives to Red Light Cameras Should Be 
Used If Government’s True Goal Was Safety  
 
Critics also claim that if revenue was not the main goal, cities 
would attempt to implement alternative forms of enforcement.189 For 
example, all-red clearance intervals at intersections, where for a brief 
period lights in all directions are red, and increasing the length of 
yellow lights are popular alternate ways to reduce red light 
accidents.190 In fact, former House Majority Leader Dick Armey 
issued a report alleging that at intersections with cameras, traffic 
engineers intentionally shortened yellow light time, which in turn 
increased the number of red light violations and generated more 
fines.191 This theory is supported by an investigation in Philadelphia 
conducted by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, finding that 
red light violations dropped by thirty-six percent after the duration of 
yellow lights were extended.192 Also, the Virginia Department of 
Transportation noted a significant decrease in red light violations at 
intersections in Fairfax County when the yellow light was lengthened 
by 1.5 seconds.193 Similarly, the Texas Transportation Institute 
reported that an increase of 0.5 to 1.5 seconds in yellow light duration 
                                                 
188 Id. 
189 Vlahos, supra note 164. 
190 Larry Copeland, Red-Light Cameras Bring Backlash, USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 
2007, available at http://usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-02-12-redlightside_x.htm. 
191 OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 
RED LIGHT RUNNING CRISIS: IS IT INTENTIONAL? (2001), 
http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/finalreport.pdf. 
192 BONNESON & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 192. 
193 NICHOLAS J. GARBER, JOHN S. MILLER, R. ELIZABETH ABEL, SAEED 
ESLAMBOLCHI, & SANTHOSH K. KORUKONDA, THE IMPACT OF RED LIGHT CAMERAS 
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decreased the frequency of red light running by at least fifty 
percent.194 
Other engineering alternatives aimed at reducing accidents caused 
by running red lights include making traffic lights more visible, 
improving intersections, retiming traffic signals, placing empty squad 
cars at intersections,195 and requiring intersections with right light 
cameras to also have countdown signal indicators, notifying motorists 
how much time is left before the light changes.196 Considering the 
numerous engineering alternatives, opponents of red light camera 
legislation claim that if city officials were actually trying to promote 
public safety rather than generate revenue, they would implement 
these less intrusive mechanisms. 
While these alternatives to red light camera systems may be good 
suggestions, they are not relevant to the constitutional analysis. The 
fact that the City “might have furthered its underlying purpose more 
artfully, more directly, or more completely, does not warrant a 
conclusion that the method it chose is unconstitutional.”197 Thus, when 
applying the rational-basis test, courts may not judge the wisdom, 
fairness or logic of legislative choices.198 Therefore, if Chicago 
determined that red light camera systems would best accomplish the 
goals of promoting public safety, enforcing traffic laws, and deterring 
illegal conduct, it is not up to the court to consider alternative or better 
ways to effectuate those goals.199 
 
                                                 
194 James A. Bonneson & Karl H. Zimmerman, EFFECT OF YELLOW-INTERVAL 
TIMING ON RED-LIGHT VIOLATION FREQUENCY AT URBAN INTERSECTIONS (Texas 
Transportation Institute) (2003). 
195 10 Reasons to Oppose Red-Light Cameras, NATIONAL MOTORISTS 
ASSOCIATION, Nov. 15, 2007,  http://www.motorists.org/blog/10-reasons-to-oppose-
red-light-cameras/. 
196 Fran Spielman, Ready, Set, Stop: Red-Lights Could Get Countdown, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, FEB. 19, 2009, http://www.suntimes.com/news/politics/1439382,CST-
NWS-redlight19.article. 
197 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 813 (1976). 
198 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 318-319 (1993). 
199 Id.  
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CONCLUSION  
 
 Automated enforcement technology must necessarily be evaluated 
under rational-basis review. In Idris v. City of Chicago, the Seventh 
Circuit applied the rational-basis test, finding Chicago’s red light 
camera ordinance constitutional. The court was faced with a very 
narrow issue, and therefore did not address the constitutionality of 
automated enforcement technology in general, or the bevy of other 
concerns raised by skeptics. This litigation, and the court’s opinion, is 
most likely just the tip of the iceberg. 
 Soon after the court issued its opinion, several state and local 
governments quickly moved forward with plans to implement other 
types of automated enforcement technology. For example, the Illinois 
State legislature is currently considering a bill permitting the use of 
automated speed cameras.200 Under the proposed law, speeding tickets 
issued by automated enforcement technology would be sent to 
registered vehicle owners and would be treated as non-moving 
offenses, just like red light camera violations.201 Also, the city of New 
Britain, Connecticut approved the purchase of a seventeen thousand 
dollar infrared-camera system called the “Plate Hunter.”202 The Plate 
Hunter is mounted to a police car and automatically reads the license 
plates of every passing vehicle, alerting officers if the owner has failed 
to pay traffic tickets.203 
 However, not everyone has accepted the Seventh Circuit’s recent 
opinion. For example, a man in Glendale, Arizona was recently 
arrested for attacking a red light camera with a pick ax.204 Also, during 
                                                 




202 William M. Bulkeley, Get the Feeling You’re Being Watched? If You’re 
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the holidays last year, a group of men all dressed as Santa Claus drove 
throughout Tempe, Arizona and placed gift-wrapped boxes over red 
light cameras, blocking their view.205 In addition to destroying or 
impairing red light camera systems, others are selling sprays and 
plastic skins for license plates, both promising to reflect a traffic-
camera flash making the license plate unreadable.206 Another group 
recently developed a free cellular phone application which identifies 
locations of red light and speed cameras.  
 While local governments and automated enforcement technology 
proponents push for more legislation allowing for enforcement 
technology, clearly, a large sector of society continues to be skeptical. 
With a flurry of activity on both sides of the issue, practitioners and 
courts must consider a number of additional concerns regarding this 
technology, such as “big-brother” privacy concerns,207 concerns that 
state law preempts local law regulating the same conduct,208 and 
                                                 
205 Id. 
206 Id. California passed a law banning the use of the spray and license plate 
covers. Id. 
207 Mary Lehman, Are Red Light Cameras Snapping Privacy Rights?, 33 U. 
Tol. L. Rev. 815. Ms. Lehman’s note concludes that red light camera systems do not 
invade privacy rights, in part because there is no expectation of privacy on public 
streets. See Agomo v. Williams, 916 A.3d 181, 190 (D.C. 2007) (citing Agomo v. 
Williams, 2003 WL 21949593, at * 7(D.C. Super. 2003) (finding that privacy 
concerns are outweighed by the legitimate concerns for safety on public streets)). 
208 The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the Minneapolis red light 
camera ordinance was in conflict with the state law prohibiting vehicles from 
running red lights, and thus, the ordinance was invalid. State v. Kuhlman, 729 N.W. 
2d 577, 582-84 (Minn., 2007). The Minnesota Highway Traffic Regulation Act 
expressly preempts local traffic ordinances that are in conflict with state traffic laws; 
there was no enabling statute in Minnesota authorizing municipalities to initiate 
automated traffic enforcement programs. Id. The court found that a conflict existed 
because under the state law, only drivers are penalized for running a red light, 
whereas, the ordinance contains a rebuttal presumption that the owner was driving 
the vehicle. Id. Further, under the state statute, “an element of the crime is that the 
defendant was the driver,” but under the red light ordinance, “the defendant must 
establish that he was not the driver and that someone else was.” Id. 
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concerns regarding the contractual relationship between local 
governments and automated enforcement technology vendors.209  
 These concerns may be valid and should be considered; however, 
the Seventh Circuit found Chicago’s red light camera ordinance to be 
constitutional and would likely uphold other similar laws. Further, 
while this decision is not binding on other jurisdictions, district courts 
will likely follow the Seventh Circuit’s lead if, and when, they 
consider the constitutionality of automated enforcement technology 
laws similar to Chicago’s ordinance. 
 Therefore, if skeptics are serious about their disdain for automated 
enforcement technology systems, perhaps they should go to state court 
or do what the villagers in Schaumburg, Illinois did: complain to local 
lawmakers, complain to city representatives, complain to state 
legislators, complain to anyone who will listen, until the cameras are 
taken down. 
                                                 
209 Local governments usually contract with vendors for the assembly, 
installation, and maintenance of the camera systems. Vendors have different 
objectives than local governments do; vendors provide services for profit. While 
there is nothing inherently wrong with this business venture, state courts have 
expressed concern regarding the amount of oversight local governments have over 
vendors and the possible conflict of interest created by the compensation scheme. 
For example, a superior court in California ruled that the city of San Diego did not 
provide sufficient oversight of its vendor, resulting in more than two hundred and 
fifty red light citations being dismissed. In re Red Light Camera Cases (Super. Ct. 
San Diego County, 2001, No. 57927SD). But see In re Red Light Photo Enforcement 
Cases, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1314 (Cal. App. 4 Dist., 2008), review granted, 193 P.3d 
281 (Cal. 2008). The vendor entirely conducted the installation, calibration, and 
maintenance of the camera equipment. The court found that the city had no 
involvement with, or supervision over, the ongoing operation of the program. 
Further, because the vendor was essentially running the entire red light program and 
was being paid on a contingency basis, the court found a potential conflict of interest 
on the part of the vendor. Id. 
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